XII. RESPONDENTS CAUSED USAT AND UFG TO ENGAGE IN UNSAFE AND UNSOUND COMPENSATION PRACTICES A. APPLICABLE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 293. At all relevant times, insured institutions were required to maintain safe and sound management and pursue financial policies that were safe and consistent with economical home financing and the purposes of insurance of accounts. 12 C.F.R. § 563.17(a) (1983-88). 294. At all relevant times, directors, officers, and other affiliated persons of insured institutions were prohibited from practices and conditions, including conflicts of interest, that adversely affected the interests of members of insured institutions and the soundness of such institutions. 12 C.F.R. § 571.7(1983-88). 295. At all relevant times, insured institutions were prohibited from providing compensation to officers, directors and employees in excess of that which was reasonable and commensurate with their duties and consistent with safe and sound management. 12 C.F.R. § 563.17(a), (b) (1983-88). 296. At all relevant times, the directors of an insured institution had a fiduciary responsibility to ascertain the reasonableness of the total compensation of any employee and to ensure that such compensation was in compliance with 12 C.F.R. §§ 563.17(b) and 563.39 and the policy guidelines set forth in FHLBB Mem. R- 42. 297. At all relevant times, insured institutions were prohibited from entering into an employment contract with any of their employees if such contract would constitute an unsafe and unsound practice, lead to material financial loss or damage to such institutions, or interfere materially with the exercise by the members of the board of directors of their duty of discretion provided by law, charter, bylaw, or regulation as to the employment or termination of employment of an officer or employee of such institutions. 12 C.F.R. § 563.39(a) (1983-88). 298. At all relevant times, unless prior written approval had been obtained from the FSLIC, any employment contract entered into by an insured institution with any of its employees was required to provide that, if the institution was in default (as that term is defined in § 401(d) of the NHA, 12 U.S.C. § 1724(d)) as a consequence of, among other things, having been placed into receivership, all obligations under such contact would terminate as of the date of default. 12 C.F.R. 563.39(b) (4) (1985-88) . 299. At all relevant times, savings and loan holding companies and their subsidiaries were prohibited from engaging in any activity for or on behalf of an insured institution subsidiary for the purpose or with the effect of evading any law or regulation applicable to such insured institution. Former 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(c)(1)(A)(1.989). B. RELEVANT FACTS 1. THE FINANCIAL CONDITION 0F USAT AND UFG 300. By the latter part of 1987, the financial condition of USAT had deteriorated to the point that it could no longer meet its minimum capital requirement. As discussed in Part IX of the Notice, in order for USAT to satisfy its minimum regulatory capital requirement Respondents caused USAT and United MBS to engage in a sham exchange of assets so that USAT could claim $101 million in maturity matching credits when the institution was only entitled to claim $32.2 million in maturity matching credits. Without the inclusion of the approximately $69 million in additional maturity matching credits generated by the sham exchange USAT failed to meet its required minimum regulatory net worth as of September 30, 1987 by approximately $5 million. See ¶ 217-218. 301. As discussed in paragraphs 73 through 77, the examination of USAT commenced by the FHLB-Dallas on November 16, 1987, the results of which were discussed with the Board of Directors of USAT and disclosed in a Form 10-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission by UFG on March 29, 1988, revealed that USAT failed to meet its regulatory capital requirements for the quarters ending September 30, 1987, and December 31, 1987. 302. As a consequence of USAT capital deficiency, as described in paragraphs 73 through 77, the Supervisory Agent, in a letter dated May 13, 1988, directed the Board of Directors of UFG to infuse capital into USAT pursuant to its Net Worth Maintenance Obligation. 303. UFG was also experiencing financial difficulties by the end of 1987 and had limited assets available to provide financial assistance to USAT under the UFG Net Worth Maintenance Obligation. As of March 31, 1988, UFG advised FHLB-Dallas it had approximately $54.7 million of debt outstanding, exclusive of its obligation under the UFG Net Worth Maintenance Obligation, and approximately $34 million of cash and securities to meet its future debt obligations. 304. Although the Board of Directors of UFG acknowledged the UFG Net Worth Maintenance Obligation, it failed to infuse into USAT any capital, and on December 30, 1988, by FHLBB Order No. 88-1534P, USAT was declared insolvent and the FSLIC appointed as receiver. FHLBB Order No. 88-1534P provided in part as follows: RESOLVED FURTHER, that the Bank Board determines that, upon the appointment of the FSLIC as receiver for the Association for the purpose of liquidation, the Association shall be in ³default,² as such term is defined in § 401(d) of the NHA, 12 U.S.C. 1724(d) (1982); and RESOLVED FURTHER, That every employment contract between the Association and its officers and employees is hereby terminated by the Bank Board, effective upon the date of default of the Association . . . 2. THE USAT AND UFG BONUS AGREEMENTS 305. On or about April 27, 1985, Respondents caused USAT to initiate the United Savings Association of Texas 1988 Executive Bonus Plan (the ³USAT Bonus Plan² or ³Bonus Plan²). The Bonus Plan was drafted by Respondent Berner, the General Counsel for USAT. Pursuant to the Bonus Plan, on or before April 30, 1988, the Compensation Committee of the USAT Board of Directors determined those employees eligible to participate in the Bonus Plan and the amount of bonus payable to each participant selected by the Committee. The Bonus Plan provided that, prior to April 30, 1988, a payment was to be made to each participant in the Bonus Plan equal to 25% of the total bonus payable to such participant. The remaining 75% of the bonus was held in trust by a trustee and was to be paid to a participant if the participant remained employed by USAT on January 1, 1989. 306. In April 1988, at a time when USAT was failing to meet its minimum capital requirement, USAT Respondents caused USAT to pay a total of $293,115 to 42 employees of USAT, including Respondents Berner, Crow, Munitz, and Gross, pursuant to the Bonus Plan. 307. The principal beneficiaries of the Bonus Plan included Respondent Gross, who was to receive a bonus totalling $167,000; Respondent Munitz, who was to receive a bonus totalling $156,000; Respondent Berner, who was to receive a bonus totalling $114,000; and Respondent Crow, who was to receive a bonus totalling $109,000. In addition, USAT deposited $879,345 in a trust account at Texas Commerce Bank in October 1988 to fund USAT's remaining obligation under the Bonus Plan. 308. On April 25, 1988, Respondents also caused UFG to enter into a Bonus Agreement with Respondents Gross (the ³UFG Bonus Agreement²). Respondent Gross had previously purchased (on June 24, 1985) 105,000 shares of stock from UFG at $7.25 per share and had given UFG a note for $761,250 due on December 31, 1990 (the ³Gross Note²). The market price of the UFG shares had ³significantly deteriorated,² and they were worth only a fraction of the original purchase price at the time the UFG Bonus Agreement was executed. Under the terms of the UFG Bonus Agreement, UFG agreed to extend the Gross Note to January 10, 1994 and to award bonuses in installments to Gross equal to the amount due under the note (less the value of the shares), thereby effectively relieving Gross of his obligation under the note. 3. USAT'S AND UFG¹S SEVERANCE AGREEMENTS 309. On June 30 and July 1, 1988, Respondents also caused UFG and USAT to enter into employment agreements with a number of senior management and directors of USAT and UFG, including Respondents Gross, Munitz, Berner, and Crow. Each of the individuals who entered into the employment contracts, with the exception of one, had been employed by UFG and USAT prior to June 30, 1988. 310. The June 30, 1988 employment contracts with UFG (The ³UFG Employment Contracts²) obligated UFG to maintain the employment of each of the executives through December 31, 1991 at a minimum level of remuneration as set forth in each of the UFG Employment Contracts. In addition, the UFG Employment Contracts contained a ³golden parachute² or severance pay provision. 311. Under the golden parachute provision, each executive was entitled to two years' annual salary plus two times his previous year's bonus upon the occurrence of various events, including the ³liquidation, dissolution, consolidation or merger of . . . USAT.² Thus, if UFG's insured depository subsidiary, USAT, were to be placed in receivership, each of the UFG/USAT executives who had executed a UFG Employment contract would be entitled to two years, compensation and twice his previous year's bonus, regardless of whether such executive continued to be employed by USAT or UFG. In order to assure that assets of UFG would be available to pay the benefits under the golden parachute provision, each UFG Employment contract specified in paragraph 9 (i) that UFG: shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the Executive an unconditional irrevocable letter of credit (the ³Initial Letter of Credit²) issued by a national banking association. The face amount of the Initial Letter of Credit shall be two (2) times the Executive¹s annual salary . . . . 312. Several of the UFG Employment Contracts entered into by executives of UFG and USAT, including the contracts with Respondents Berner and Crow, stated that the executives had previously entered into similar employment agreements with UFG on September 9, 1987. One of the principal differences between the earlier agreements and the June 30, 1988 employment contracts was the addition of paragraph 9(i), which provided for a letter of credit to secure the severance payments. 313. The purpose and effect of the inclusion of paragraph 9(i) in the UFG Employment Contracts was to provide a mechanism for UFG to set aside assets to fund severance payments of executives of USAT and UFG. 314. One day later, on July 1, 1988, USAT entered into virtually identical companion employment contracts with the same officers and directors (the ³USAT Employment Contracts²), including Respondents Gross, Berner, Crow, and Munitz. The USAT Employment Contracts provided for the identical golden parachute severance payments, but specified that these obligations would be secured by letters of credit obtained by USAT, rather than UFG. 315. USAT was unable to obtain letters of credit. Instead, on October 17, 1988, Respondents caused USAT to deposit $6,612,908 into an escrow account at First City National Bank, Houston, Texas, to secure USAT's performance of its severance obligations under the USAT Employment Contracts. 316. The only material difference between the two sets of companion employment agreements was that the USAT Employment Contracts, paragraph 18, identified various circumstances under which the agreements would automatically terminate. The USAT Employment Contracts, however, failed to provide that the contracts would terminate in the event USAT was in default (as a consequence of being placed in receivership or some other event of default as defined in section 401(d) of the NHA), as required under 12 C.F.R. § 563.39(b) (4) 317. Additionally, paragraph 18(e) of the USAT Employment Contracts provided as follows: The terms and conditions of the Agreement shall become effective if, but only if, [UFG] shall be unable to comply with all of its obligations and make all of its payment as set forth in and under the [UFG] Agreement. 318. Although USAT's obligation under paragraph 18(e) of the USAT Employment Contracts was conditioned upon UFG being unable to make required compensation payments under the UFG Employment Contracts, at all relevant times USAT paid the base salaries of the parties to the USAT Employment Contracts. As a consequence, UFG¹s only obligation under the UFG Employment Contracts was to provide a source of funding for the severance payment obligations of USAT, which by operation of law, pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 563(b)(4), were otherwise subject to automatic termination and would become unenforceable in the event USAT was placed in receivership by the FHLBB. 4. SUPERVISORY INTERVENTION 319. In about June 1988, FHLB-Dallas began a review of the USAT Employment Contracts and other compensation arrangements between USAT and its employees. On October 27, 1988 Supervisory Agent Neil Twomey wrote a letter to the Board of Directors of USAT that stated as follows: We have reviewed employment contracts that United Savings Association of Texas (³United²) entered with various members of senior management, including Jenard Gross, Lawrence Connell, Arthur S. Berner, Michael R. Crow, J.J. Gray, Jr., James N. Jackson, James L. Wolfe, Bruce F. Williams and Dominic R. Bruno. Each and every contract was found to be in violation of Section 563.39 of the Insurance Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 563.39 (1988) (³Section 563.39²) in significant respects. Further, because these contracts provided for excessive compensation and severance payments, their execution at a time when United was approaching, or had actually reported insolvency, represented an unsafe and unsound practice by the Board of Directors and senior management of United. 320. The letter directed the Board of Directors of USAT, pursuant to the authority granted under 12 C.F.R. 563.13(d), to give notice to each of the members of senior management that the USAT Employment Contracts would not be extended beyond December 31, 1988, and further instructed as follows: Make no payments, and allow no payments to be made directly or indirectly, pursuant to any employment contract, bonus agreement, retirement, pension or profit sharing plan, severance agreement, employee benefit plan or other similar agreement, or fund any escrow account related to such agreements, except for base monthly salary payments to employees pursuant to contracts upon which United is itself legally obligated, without the prior written approval of the Supervisory Agent. 321. On November 7, 1988, the USAT Board of Directors terminated the escrow account at First City National Bank and the $6,612,980 of USAT assets placed in escrow to secure the severance payments under the USAT Employment Contracts were subsequently returned to USAT. 322. After being advised of the FHLB-Dallas concerns regarding management's compensation, the USAT Board of Directors also resolved to terminate the Bonus Plan trust as it pertained to the eight individuals identified in the October 27, 1988 letter from FHLB-Dallas. On November 9, 1988 USAT advised the Texas Commerce Bank of its resolution and instructed the Bank to return to USAT all funds held in trust for these eight participants in the Bonus Plan. 323. On December 15, 1988 the FHLB-Dallas further advised the USAT Board of Directors of the specific concerns of the FHLB-Dallas regarding the Bonus Plan. The letter stated the following: [W]e consider the contemplated payment of funds under the ³1988 Executive Bonus Plan² to those employees who are entitled to benefits pursuant to employment contracts with United Savings Association of Texas and/or United Financial Group, Inc. to be an unsafe and unsound practice. We therefore take supervisory objection to the following bonus payments: M. Crow $81,750 A. Berner 85,500 J. Jackson 67,500 B. Munitz 117,000 J. Gray 48,750 B. Williams 37,500 J. Wolfe 37,500 $475,500 In light of United's materially insolvent position, we also take objection to the payment of these bonuses pursuant to Section 563.13(d) of the Insurance Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 563.13(d)(1988). * * * You are also reminded that my letter dated October 27, 1988, directed you to make no more payments pursuant to any bonus agreement without specific prior supervisory approval. 324. The USAT Employment Contracts as well as the Bonus Plan, pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 563.39(b)(4), terminated by operation of law on December 30, 1988, upon the appointment of FSLIC as the receiver for USAT. 5. UFG'S PAYMENT OF SEVERANCE CLAIMS 325. Thereafter, former executives separated from USAT by the receivership asserted claims for severance payments against UFG under the golden parachute provisions in the UFG Employment Contracts as well as claims for bonuses under the Bonus Plan. 326. Representatives of the FSLIC advised Respondents in about May 1989, that the FSLIC believed utilizing the assets of UFG to fund the severance payments of former USAT employees under the UFG Employment Contracts was an unsafe and unsound practice. Specifically, the FSLIC advised Respondents that, in light of USAT's insolvency, UFG had an obligation to utilize whatever capital it had available to satisfy the UFG Net Worth Maintenance Agreement. 327. Additionally, FSLIC advised Respondents that the UFG Employment Contracts were illegal, were no longer enforceable, and violated 12 C.F.R. § 563.39(b)(5), in that they permitted UFG, as a holding company, to pay severance obligations of USAT, its insured subsidiary, which had automatically terminated upon the appointment of the receiver and were unenforceable against USAT. FSLIC also advised Respondents that permitting UFG to make severance payments that its insured depository subsidiary, USAT, was not permitted to pay would violate 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(c)(1)(A), which prohibited a savings and loan holding company from engaging in any activity or rendering any service on behalf of an insured depository institution for the purpose or effect of evading any law or regulation applicable to an insured institution. 328. Notwithstanding the advice of the FSLIC, on July 31, 1989, the directors of UFG, including Respondents Berner and Munitz, approved the settlement of severance claims asserted against UFG arising under the UFG Employment Contracts. Through its Corporate Counsel, Berner, UFG agreed to compromise $3,040,278 in severance claims asserted by six former executives of USAT for $666,884. Among others, Crow received $142,528. The directors of UFG also agreed to indemnify the settling executives for any claims that might be asserted against such executives arising out of their association with USAT or UFG. 329. After USAT was placed in receivership, Respondent Berner continued to be employed as Executive Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary of UFG. In these capacities, he continued to be paid at the same salary rate at which he was previously compensated by USAT. Over the next three years, Respondent Berner received total compensation of $381,000 in 1989, $328,000 in 1990 and $250,376 in 1991. Notwithstanding the fact that Respondent Berner continued to be employed by UFG, on October 13, 1989, the directors of UFG agreed to pay Respondent Berner, in addition to his agreed upon compensation by UFG, an additional $147,000 to settle any severance claims Respondent Berner might assert against UFG under the golden parachute provisions of his UFG Employment Contract and the Bonus Plan. 330. After USAT was placed in receivership, Respondent Munitz continued to be employed as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of UFG. In these capacities, he received total compensation of $337,937 in 1989, $116,866 in 1990 and $23,000 in 1991. Notwithstanding the fact that Respondent Munitz continued to be employed by UFG, the directors of UFG, agreed on December 1, 1989 to pay Respondent Munitz, in addition to his agreed upon compensation by UFG, an additional $98,000 to settle his claims under the Bonus Plan and any severance claims Respondent Munitz might assert against UFG under the golden parachute provisions of his UFG Employment Contract. 331. In total, UFG utilized over $900,000 of UFG assets to compromise bonus and severance claims asserted by executives of UFG and USAT, including Respondents Berner, Munitz, and Crow, arising out of the USAT Employment Contracts as well as the Bonus Plan, which by applicable regulations and order of the FHLBB, such executives would not have otherwise been able to recover from USAT under the USAT Employment Contracts. 332. In November 1988, Respondent Gross voluntarily resigned as officer and member of the Boards of Directors of USAT and UFG. In return for Gross relinquishing his rights to severance payments and other benefits under the UFG Employment Contract and the conveyance of 105,000 shares of UFG stock, which were then virtually worthless, Respondents discharged Respondents Gross from his obligation to repay the principal and interest on the loan in the amount of approximately $835,000. C. THIRTEENTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF: RESPONDENTS CAUSED UNSAFE AND UNSOUND BONUSES, SETTLEMENT, AND SEVERANCE PACKAGES TO BE AUTHORIZED AND PAID TO OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS (Respondents Munitz, Berner, Gross, and Crow) 333. OTS repeats and incorporates the allegations set forth in paragraphs I to 332 above. 334. Respondents Berner, Munitz, Gross, and Crow caused USAT to establish the Bonus Plan and distributed assets of USAT to executives of USAT and UFG pursuant to the Bonus Plan at a time when USAT failed to meet applicable minimum capital requirements. By causing USAT to establish the Bonus Plan and accepting bonuses pursuant to the Bonus Plan, at a time when the financial condition of USAT did not justify such compensation and when they posed a risk of material loss or damage to USAT, Respondents Berner, Munitz, Gross, and Crow engaged in an unsafe and unsound practice and provided unreasonable compensation to themselves and others in violation 12 C.F.R. §§ 563.17(b) and 563.39(a). 335. The USAT Employment Contracts did not comply with applicable regulatory requirements under 12 C.F.R § 563.39 in significant respects. Among other things, the contracts did not provide that they would automatically terminate in the event USAT was in default as required under 12 U.S.C. § 563.39(b)(5). Additionally, the USAT Employment Contracts: (a) provided for excessive compensation and severance payments to executives of USAT and UFG; (b) were executed at time when USAT failed to meet applicable capital requirements and, therefore, the financial condition of USAT did not justify such contracts; and (c) posed an unreasonable risk of material financial loss or damage to USAT. Respondents Munitz, Berner, Gross, and Crow, by causing USAT to enter into the USAT Employment Contracts, knowingly and recklessly engaged in unsafe and unsound practices and approved unreasonable compensation for themselves and others, in the form of salary, severance payments, and other benefits, in violation of 12 C.F.R. 563.17(b) and 12 C.F.R. § 563.39. 336. The UFG Employment Contracts provided an indirect means by which executives of USAT and UFG could receive bonus and severance benefits authorized by the Board of Directors of USAT, which, by operation of 12 C.F.R. § 563.39(b)(5), automatically terminated upon the receivership of USAT on December 30, 1988. Respondents Berner, Munitz, Gross, and Crow's actions to cause UFG to enter into the Employment Contracts and the provision of severance benefits and bonuses to executives of USAT that such executives would not have otherwise been able to recover from USAT resulted in UFG engaging in activity for or rendering a service on behalf of USAT, UFG's insured depository subsidiary, for the purpose or with the effect of evading 12 C.F.R. § 563.39(b)(5), a regulation applicable to USAT, in violation of 12 U.S.C. § 1730a (c) (1) (A) . 337. Respondents Berner, Munitz, Gross, and Crow, by their actions to cause UFG to enter into the UFG Employment Contracts and their acceptance of payments from UFG in the compromise of claims arising out of the UFG Employment Contracts, participated in the above described violation of 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(c)(1)(A). 338. Respondents Berner and Munitz compromised the UFG severance and bonus claims asserted by former executives of USAT and UFG arising out of such executives' employment at USAT and forgave Gross for his $835,000 liability under the Gross Note at a point in time when UFG had insufficient assets to comply, even partially, with its obligation to maintain the net worth of USAT and had failed to infuse any capital into USAT under the UFG Net Worth Maintenance obligation. Respondents Berner and Munitz engaged in an unsafe and unsound practice by paying the severance and bonus claims of former executives of USAT and thereby dissipating assets which otherwise should have been used to infuse capital into USAT in compliance with the UFG Net Worth Maintenance Obligation. 339. Respondents Berner, Munitz, Gross, and Crow, by causing UFG to make the severance and bonus payments and/or accepting severance and bonus payments from UFG, knowingly and recklessly participated in the unsafe and unsound practices, violations, and breaches of fiduciary duty described above.